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1
Abstract12
This paper evaluates whether effort regulation could achieve the goal of pro-13
tecting low-abundance species in mixed fisheries. We construct a two-species14
bio-economic model and compare the stock abundance ratio in the end of the15
fishing season with the ratio prior to the fishing. Fishers’ profit maximization16
problem is governed by three key factors: (a) the overall efficiency of catching17
different species (catchability), (b) the price of different species, and (c) their18
ability to catch the favoured species separately from the less-favoured species19
(separability). Using a Monte Carlo sampling of feasible parameters space, we20
show that effort regulation has good chances (87% of the cases) of maintaining21
the end stock ratio near equal levels (12 < stock ratio < 2) when the initial stock22
ratio is equal. If the initial stock ratio is not equal, however, there is a high risk23
(about 50% of the cases) that effort control increases differences in the rel-24
ative species abundances, rather than diminishing them. The effects depend25
on whether the key factors determining fishing profitability are counteracting26
or reinforcing each other, and their relative strength. Our results warn against27
placing too much faith on the ability of effort regulation to protect species at28
low abundances from excessive exploitation.29
KEYWORDS: mixed fisheries, effort control, bioeconomics modeling, Monte30
Carlo approach, fisheries management31
JEL CODES: Q22, Q5732
1 Introduction33
Total allowable catch (TAC) regulation, a form of output control, is a single-species man-34
agement approach that sets stock-specific catch quotas (Stefansson and Rosenberg, 2005).35
In a mixed fishery where many species are caught simultaneously, management relying on36
stock-specific TACs can be impractical because of data requirements and costs, and be-37
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cause of discarding of over-quota catches (Daan, 1997; Hilborn et al., 2004; Baudron et al.,38
2010), or when discarding is not allowed, because species with restrictive quotas (‘choke39
species’) prevent full utilization of species with more permissive quotas (Kuriyama et al.,40
2016; Alzorriz et al., 2018; Mortensen et al., 2018). To address these problems, input con-41
trol regimes, which are often species-unspecific and account for the multitude of species42
living in an ecosystem, are sometimes favoured for the management of mixed fisheries43
(Pope, 2002; Squires et al., 2017). Input control regimes set quotas at the operational unit44
level; for example, quotas are given as total allowable fishing days per fleet category, fur-45
ther split among the individual license holders (Laurec et al., 1991; Andersen et al., 2010;46
Danielsen and Agnarsson, 2018).47
Effort regulation has been practised in many fisheries (Squires et al., 2017), including48
some Mediterranean fisheries (Vielmini et al., 2017; Mulazzani et al., 2018), the sole and49
plaice fisheries in the North Sea (European Union Committee, 2008), and the demersal50
fisheries in Faroese waters (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007; Danielsen and Agnarsson, 2018).51
Moreover, license control, a dominant fisheries management strategy in the Global South,52
represents a special form of effort regulation. In these fisheries, a total number of licenses53
is specified, often in combination with other measures such as seasonal fishing bans (FAO,54
2009; Shen and Heino, 2014; Tromeur and Doyen, 2018).55
The fishing days system in the Faroe Islands is one of the most studied examples of56
effort regulation (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007; Baudron et al., 2010; Danielsen and Agnarsson,57
2018). The system was introduced in 1996 to manage the demersal fisheries with cod,58
haddock and saithe as their main targets. While sometimes hailed as highly successful, a59
10-years appraisal study by Jákupsstovu et al. (2007) showed that Faroese Total Allowable60
Effort (TAE) system did not achieve some of its key objectives, namely controlling the61
fishing mortality of the key species. This conclusion has been upheld by later assessments62
(Danielsen and Agnarsson, 2018). Most fishers opportunistically targeted the most valu-63
able species, cod, leading to high levels of mortality for this valuable stock even when less64
abundant. The design of TAE system in the Faroe Islands relied on the assumption that65
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when fishers choose their target species to maximize their profit, they target the species66
that provide the highest catch rates and ‘automatically’ protect the less abundant species67
with lower catch rates (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007; Baudron et al., 2010; Danielsen and Ag-68
narsson, 2018). However, this is an assumption rather than a fundamental property of69
effort-controlled fisheries.70
Previous studies on TAE regulation have often been conducted in a single species set-71
ting and in comparison with TACs; for example, fishing vessel behaviour under TAE and72
TAC regulation (Anderson, 1999; Stefansson and Rosenberg, 2005), and the effect of un-73
certainty on the efficiency of catch or effort controls (Danielsson, 2002; Yamazaki et al.,74
2009). Another strand of literature examined the degree of input substitution between re-75
stricted inputs and unrestricted inputs in a TAE system. Examples include the substitution76
intensity of restrictions on fishing days versus restrictions on vessel tonnage of the British77
Columbia commercial salmon fishery (Dupont, 1991), and the substitution between physi-78
cal inputs and fishing location of the UK beam trawl fishery (Pascoe and Robinson, 1998).79
Until now, effort regulation has been assessed in a context of specific fishery systems. How-80
ever, case-specific detail may hinder identifying the key factors that determine the success81
(or failure) of effort regulation in mixed fisheries.82
The key factors affecting fishers’ targeting decision in mixed-fisheries have previously83
been studied piece by piece; for example, Katsukawa and Matsuda (2003) focused on the84
effect of non-linear catchability, Noailly et al. (2003) on the effect of price on switching85
harvest strategies, and Tromeur and Doyen (2018) on the effect of technical interactions.86
As a result, the conclusions of these papers may differ depending on specific underlying as-87
sumptions. When perfect separability is assumed, target switching may be able to protect88
the less abundant species from being overfished (Katsukawa and Matsuda, 2003; Bischi89
et al., 2013a,b); when joint production is unavoidable, species with lower price and growth90
but higher intraspecific competition and catchability are more prone to overfish, as con-91
cluded by Tromeur and Doyen (2018). We attempt to study all these key aspects together92
to give a more holistic picture about their interplay. We are specifically interested in effort93
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regulation of mixed fisheries, but our results can be interpreted more generally as repre-94
senting profit-oriented, effort-limited exploitation that could occur in unregulated fisheries95
or in a single-owner case.96
The purpose of this paper is to present a generic analysis of factors determining the97
practicality of effort regulation using a simplified two-species fishery system. We gener-98
alize earlier models by treating separability and stock elasticity of harvest as parameters;99
the former describes fishers’ ability to target and catch a specific species and the latter the100
degree of schooling behaviour of the fish. Our aim is to show when the effort regulation101
approach can work in terms of achieving the biological goal of not exhausting any of the102
species, or when it may not work, and why. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-103
lows. The first section illustrates key factors governing fisherman’s targeting decision and104
detailed model specifications. In the subsequent sections, we first present an analytical opti-105
mal harvest rule based on a common assumption about catchability parameter, followed by106
an evaluation of effort regulation based on a generic set-up using Monte Carlo simulations.107
2 Methods108
Identifying key factors109
We start by identifying three key factors that describe the dynamics of a mixed fishery:110
the relative abundance and catchability of fish stocks, which determine the potential catch111
rates; the relative price for different fish species, which relates to the revenues obtained;112
and the ability of fishermen to catch the favoured species separately from the unfavoured113
species. These three factors form the cornerstones of effort regulation (Fig. 1).114
Catchability is a species-specific parameter that describes the efficiency of fishing op-
eration in catching a certain type of fish, therefore depending on both characteristics of the
target (e.g., fish behaviour) and the fishing operation (e.g., efficiency of the fishing gears).
Typically, catchability q of species i is defined through a linear relationship between catch
rate (Ci), effort (E), and stock abundance (Ni), Ci = qiENi. However, this simple model is
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Figure 1: Key factors determining the practicality of effort regulation
often acknowledged to be inappropriate (Winters and Wheeler, 1985; Hilborn and Walters,
1992; Harley et al., 2001); for instance, a high catch per unit effort (C/E) for schooling
species can still be maintained even at a low level of stock abundance. We thus follow the
alternative formulation proposed by Steinshamn (2011) and Liu and Heino (2013) where
catchability is measured in terms of the local stock density ρ experienced by a fisher:




i ENi, with ρi = aiN
bi
i . (1)
Thus q̃i in Eq. 1, termed local catchability, is analogous with qi in the classic formulation,115
but it has absorbed the scaling parameter ai and is measured relative to local density ρi. Ni116
is stock abundance normalized against carrying capacity Ki. Parameter bi is stock elasticity117
of harvest, with a typical value between 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1. The limit case (bi = 0) refers the118
species that is extremely schooling and the fishers can locate the schools perfectly. bi = 1119
represents a non-schooling species that is uniformly distributed.120
The influence of the market is captured by the relative price of the two species. We
consider two ways of price determination: i) exogenous price, in which price is constant,
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and ii) endogenous price, in which price is a decreasing function of the catch. Specifically,
pi(Ci) = max(0, pi,0 (1−ωi (Ci−Ci,0))) , (2)
where pi,0 is the initial unit price and pi,0ωi is the slope of the price function. When ωi = 0,121
pi = pi,0 and the price is constant (exogenous price); when ω > 0, price is endogenous,122
with higher total catches resulting in reduced unit price. The price pi,0 is obtained when123
Ci = Ci,0, where Ci,0 is the optimal catch on the first fishing day when ωi = 0. That is to124
say, we express the price relative to the price obtained during the first fishing trip.125
The final element in our model is ‘separability’ (τ). This is a fishery-level parameter126
and refers to fishers’ ability to catch the favoured species, or in economics jargon, to the127
degree of joint production. It depends on biological factors (e.g., intrinsic differences in128
behaviour and micro-habitat use of the alternative species), fishers’ skill of using these129
differences in fishing, and available fishing technologies that fishers can utilize (Branch130
and Hilborn, 2008; Squires et al., 2017). We take τ = 1 to mean perfect separability where131
only the targeted species is caught, and τ = 0 complete inability to catch species separately132
such that the total effort is equally shared among the two harvested species. For every unit133
of fishing effort made by a fisherman (ei), only fraction 1+τ2 is effectively converted into134
catching the target species (i), whereas fraction 1−τ2 ‘leaks’ to the other species, leading135
to its bycatch. Thus, we differentiate the nominal effort targeted on species i, ei, and the136
effective effort Ei, where Ei = 1+τ2 ei +
1−τ
2 e−i and e−i denotes effort targeting the other137
species.138
Biological model and assessment criteria139
We model a simple fishery system consisting of two species that share the same overall140
habitat but are otherwise independent. Discarding is assumed not to occur. Our model141
focuses on stock dynamics in a single fishing season, which comprises a number of fishing142
trips of equal length; the length is inconsequential for our analysis and we will assume143
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daily trips for convenience. Recruitment is assumed to occur outside the fishing season and144
can thus be ignored.145
If stock abundance in the beginning of a fishing day/trip is N0, it will drop to Nt in146
the end of that fishing trip due to natural and fishing mortality. The stock dynamics 1 is147
specified in the following:148
Nt =








1−b if 0≤ b < 1.
(3)
where F and M are respectively fishing and natural mortality. Other notations follow Eq. 1.149
The key question is whether profit-oriented fishing can lead to protection of the less150
abundant species? We use the stock size ratio as the metric to assess this question. As long151
as natural mortality during the fishing season is negligible, changes in this metric are driven152
by harvesting. If the stock ratio in the end of the fishing season rT = NT1 /N
T
2 is closer to153
unity than the initial stock ratio r0 = N01/N
0
2 , then the originally less abundant species must154
have suffered less from fishing than the other species. In other words, it has been offered a155
degree of protection. This is a necessary condition for effort regulation to have the potential156
to be successful. We emphasize, however, that this criterion is not a sufficient condition to157
ensure sustainable fisheries, because it does not address simultaneous stock depletion. This158
could be prevented by setting the total effort quota sufficiently low; the determination of159
suitable total effort is beyond the scope of our current analysis.160
We consider two basic scenarios in our analysis: (a) ‘even’ scenario in which two161
species in the mixed fishery have the same initial stock (i.e., r0 = N01/N
0
2 = 1); (b) ‘bi-162
ased’ scenario in which their initial stock levels are different (here r0 = 2). In the former163
case, the success criterion is that the final stock size ratio rT does not deviate too much164
from unity, and in the latter case, that the final stock size ratio rT has moved closer to unity.165
1The expression for Nt is derived via integrating over a full fishing trip dNdt = −(F +M)N, and F =
q̃Nb−1E. For detailed derivation see Steinshamn (2011); Liu and Heino (2013)
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Profit maximizing fleet166
The goal of the fleet manager is to maximize her payoffs per fishing trip for the entire167
fleet. We define effort in terms of fishing days. The total allowable fishing days per fishing168
season allocated to a fleet is set at Q. We assume the fleet consists of n identical boats. The169
strategy option for the manager is to decide the number of boats to target different species170
i ∈ (1,2). The maximization will be repeated for each fishing trip until Q is exhausted or171











, i ∈ (1,2) (4)
s.t.
∑i ei,t ≤ n (Fleet capacity)
∑t ∑i ei,t ≤ Q (Effort control)
Ei,t = 1+τ2 ei,t +
1−τ
2 e−i,t (Separability)
Vt ≥ 0 (Non-negativity)
where price of fish pi is determined by the price function in the Eq. 2; c is cost per unit173
effort, e and E denote respectively nominal effort and effective effort. Provided that the174
species are not fully separable, Eq. 4 gives two sources of income streams from each175
species. C denotes total catch per trip, given by the function by Liu and Heino (2013),176









N0(1− e−(Ft+M)) = q̃Etq̃Et+M N0(1− e












dt if 0≤ b < 1.
(5)
The maximization problem in Eq. 4 is subject to several constraints: (1) fleet capacity178
constraint: total fishing boats per trip shall not exceed the fleet capacity n, assuming trip179
length of 1 day/trip; (2) effort constraint: total fishing days per season is no more than Q;180
(3) species separability constraint: only part of the effort is converted into effective effort;181
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and (4) non-negative profit per fishing trip.182
Because more boats targeting the same species result in faster depletion of the resource,183
and may influence the price (if ω > 0), the optimal decision of one fisherman depends on184
what other fishermen decide to do. This can potentially lead to a game-like situation, but185
this is avoided if we assume that the decision horizon is one fishing trip (e.g., 1 day) only,186
and the problem reduces to a simple optimization task analogous to ‘perfect competition’187
of identical competitors in economics, or ‘ideal free distribution’ in ecology (Fretwell and188
Lucas, 1969). Thus, to understand the collective behaviour of individual fishermen, we can189
simply find the distribution of effort that maximizes the collective pay-off per fishing trip.190
The solutions of the model correspond to optimal policies in a single owner case too.191
Monte Carlo sampling method192
The model is not analytically tractable except for some special cases. To obtain an overview193
on how key factors affect the performance of effort regulation, we turn to the Monte Carlo194
method of repeated random sampling approach. Key factors and their assumptions are sum-195
marized in Table 1 and are very general. We assume b and τ to follow uniform distribution196
because they are naturally bounded between 0 and 1 (while b could exceed 1, b = 1 is a197
defensible upper limit, see Steinshamn (2011)). Price and catchability ratios are assumed198
to be log-normally distributed such that the mean ratio is one. The results are based on199
50,000 random replicates.200
3 Optimal harvest decisions in a mixed fishery201
A static setting202
For the case of uniformly distributed fish stock (b = 1), we can analytically show that203
optimal harvest decision in our model is characterized by the relative marginal profit of204
effort (MPE) of the two stocks, i.e., the difference in the marginal increase of profit when205
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Table 1: Key assumptions for Monte Carlo sampling. Actual levels of prices and costs are
immaterial as long as fishing is profitable.
Parameter Description Value Distribution
τ separability 0≤ τ ≤ 1 uniform
b stock elasticity of harvest 0≤ b≤ 1 uniform
log( p1p2 ) price ratio µ = 0,sd = 0.5 normal
log( q̃1q̃2 ) catchability ratio µ = 0,sd = 0.5 normal
ωi slope of the price function 0 or 50 n.a.
Mi natural mortality 0.2 yr−1 n.a.
Q effort quota 1000 days n.a.
n fleet capacity 20 n.a.
Note: µ denotes mean and sd standard deviation.
effort targeting a specific species is increased. We can distinguish three cases:206
• If MPE1 >MPE2, then only species 1 is harvested (e1 > 0 and e2 = 0).207
• If MPE1 <MPE2, then only species 2 is harvested (e1 = 0 and e2 > 0).208
• If MPE1 =MPE2, then both species are harvested (e1 > 0 and e2 > 0).209
The expression for MPE in the general case is too complicated to yield insight (see the210
Appendix). However, if we assume that natural mortality is insignificant over short time211
periods and can be ignored (M = 0), MPE1 >MPE2 if p1q̃1N1e−q̃1E1 > p2q̃2N2e−q̃2E2 . High212
price p and initial stock N will therefore favour targeting one stock over the other. The213
role of catchability q̃ is ambiguous because its effect can be either positive or negative,214
depending on the other parameters.215
When fishers cannot discriminate the two species (τ = 0), every unit of effort is equally216
divided between them, and any effort allocation satisfying the fleet capacity constraint will217
be optimal. This is a trivial case, and in the subsequent discussion we will focus on the218
case τ > 0 only.219
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Seasonal patterns of harvest decisions220
Because a fishing season consists of a number of fishing trips in our model, we will study221
how MPE evolves over time. There are three generic patterns of time evolution in the222
model:223
• A single species is the sole target species during the whole fishing season. MPE of224
one species is always greater than the other.225
• A single species is the sole target species in the beginning of the fishing season. After226
MPEs are equalized between the species, both species are targeted.227
• A single species is the sole target species in the beginning of the fishing season.228
MPEs switch the rank that leads to a target switch, i.e., the other species becomes the229
sole target.230
The first two cases follow naturally from the rules of optimal harvest described in the231
previous section: the fishermen will target the more profitable stock, or if both stocks are232
equally profitable, they will split their effort such that the equal profitability is maintained.233
Initially, one stock is almost always more profitable. Whether targeting the more profitable234
species leads to equal profitability during the period of interest depends on the details. First,235
while targeting one species will often cause the MPEs to converge towards each other, this236
is not always the case. MPEs may diverge if separability τ is low, or if one species has237
higher natural mortality M than the other. Second, even when targeting one species is238
causing the MPEs to converge, full equalization might not be reached during the available239
fishing season.240
Fig. 2a–c illustrates how targeting one species reduces its profitability, eventually re-241
sulting in the situation in which both species have similar MPEs. In this example, species242
1 has initially a higher MPE and is the sole target during the first part of the season. Over243
time, MPE for the target species 1 decreases more than MPE for the bycatch species 2244
because fishing reduces its abundance more than that of the bycatch species. When both245
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species reach the same MPE level, the effort (Fig. 2b) is divided between the two species246
such that the MPE equality is maintained. In this example, effort regulation first causes247













































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Two qualitatively different scenarios of marginal profit of effort and effort allocation over time,
together with the corresponding relative stock size. On the top row (a–c), separability is high (τ = 0.8). Two
distinct phases are observed: first, only the species 1 that is more profitable is targeted, and second, once the
profitability of species 1 is reduced to that of species 2, both species are targeted with an effort allocation
that keeps their profitability similar. On the bottom row (d–f), separability is lower (τ = 0.57). This leads to
dynamics that are initially similar, but instead of profitability equalization, the initial bycatch species becomes
the sole target. Parameters other than τ are equal for both scenarios: N0 = [0.5,0.5], b = [0.813,0.086],
p = [53924,100000], q̃ = [0.0003,0.0003], ω = [0,0], c = 0.1, Q = 1000.
The dynamic in the third case where the MPE curves of two species cross each other250
and the fishermen switch their target species is more intricate. Fig. 2d–f illustrates how251
such target switching can result from effort ‘spill-over’. Fishermen first target the more252
profitable species 1. As its profitability declines, both species 1 and 2 become targeted. At253
this point, it is possible that even when species 2 is the sole target, species 1 is caught so254
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much as bycatch that its MPE stays lower than that of the target species. We will elaborate255
further on this point in the Section 4 when discussing reinforcing effect.256
4 Assessing performance of effort regulation through Monte257
Carlo simulations258
The overall performance of effort regulation259
We assess performance of effort regulation by simulating a large number (50,000) of cases260
generated by sampling a realistic parameter space (Table 1). When the fisheries are initiated261
with two species at equal abundance, effort regulation can often keep the relative stock262
levels within ‘reasonable’ bounds. Specifically, if we require that the stock ratio NT1 /N
T
2 at263
the end of fishing season remains within the interval [0.5,2] (i.e., the less abundant species264
has density at least 50% of that of the more abundant species), effort regulation is successful265
in 87% of the cases (Fig. 3a). However, if the fisheries are initiated with one species266
being twice as abundant as the other one, the chances of effort regulation meeting the267
same success criterion are considerably lower, about 51% (Fig. 3b). In these cases, effort268
regulation has either maintained the original biased stock ratio, or ‘corrected’ it towards269
equality. However, there is also a sizeable proportion of cases – 40% – where the relative270
stock abundance becomes driven towards more extreme bias in favour of the originally271
more abundant species. In the remaining fraction of the cases, the originally less abundant272
species becomes more abundant as a result of fishing.273
Single-factor effects274
We now investigate the characteristics of the cases where effort regulation can be success-275
ful. Figures 4 and 5 show the density distributions of the final stock ratio against key276
parameters that we varied. They reveal two main patterns. First, the fishers’ ability to277
catch target species, separability τ (the only stock-unspecific parameter we varied), has278
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(b) Biased initial stock ratio




















Figure 3: Histogram of stock ratio in the end of the fishing season for (a) even (N01 = N02 ) and (b) biased
initial stock ratio (N01/N
0
2 = 2). Cyan bands indicate the range where end stock ratio is seen as ‘reasonable’,
defined as NT1 /N
T
2 ∈ [0.5,2]. Price is constant (ω = [0,0]); other parameters as detailed in Table 1.
an important role. When separability is low (τ → 0), stock ratio at the end of the season279
usually stays near its initial value, be it equal or biased (Fig. 4a and 5a). However, when280
separability is high (τ → 1), the stock ratio diverges away from its initial value, in one281
direction or the other. If the initial stock abundances are even, then a bimodal distribution282
emerges (Fig. 4a). If the initial relative stock abundances are biased, then the final stock283
ratio shows a unimodal but skewed distribution (Fig. 5a). Across all τ , there is a tendency284
for the stock ratio to move closer to unity; the average final stock ratio is NT1 /N
T
2 0≈ 1.15,285
although there is a long tail of cases towards more extreme bias (Fig. 5a). Nevertheless, in286
an average sense, effort regulation offers a degree of protection for the less abundant stock287
when starting from unequal initial abundances.288
Second, the parameters that are stock-specific show similar patterns. If the relative289
stock abundances are initially even, the abundances at the end of season have best chances290
of maintaining the status quo when the species are similar in terms of their schooling pa-291
rameter b, catchability q̃, and price p (Fig. 4b–d). On the other hand, if the initial relative292
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stock abundances are biased, then the similarity of the species, on average, tends to hinder293
equalization of relative abundances. However, if the species differences are such that the294
initially less abundant species is a more favourable target (higher price p or catchability q̃,295
or lower stock elasticity to harvest b), then equalization is more likely to happen (Fig. 5b–296
d). Differences in the opposite directions will consequently make equalization less likely.297
Most Monte Carlo replicates in Figures 4 and 5 show targeting of the same species298
through the fishing season. This happens because MPEs of the two stock converge so299
slowly that they do not meet during the available time, or because of the bycatch effect that300
may even make them diverge. Equalization of MPEs followed by targeting of both species301
for the rest of the season (similar to Fig. 2a–c) happens only in about 15% of replicates.302
Target swapping (Fig. 2d–f) is even rarer, occurring in about 4% of replicates for the even303
initial scenario and less than 1% of replicates for the biased initial scenario.304
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Figure 4: Density plots for the ‘even’ scenario (initial stock ratio N01/N02 = 1): black curves are contour
lines, blue curves indicate the smoothed median density, and black dotted lines are reference level when the
two species are symmetric. Price is declining with increasing catches (ω = [50,50]); other parameters as
detailed in Table 1.
Interaction effects305
When the species differ in more than one parameter, these differences could either reinforce306
or compensate for each other. For example, if one species has a higher unit price but307
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Figure 5: Density plots for the ‘biased’ scenario (initial stock ratio N01/N02 = 2 indicated by red dotted
lines): black curves are contour lines, blue curves indicate the smoothed median density, and black dotted
lines are reference level when the two species are symmetric. Price is constant (ω = [0,0]); other parameters
as detailed in Table 1.
lower catchability, it can be an equally attractive target to a cheaper species with higher308
catchability. This ‘compensation effect’ is seen in Figure 6 as contour lines that are tilted309
relative to the axes. In particular, a balanced final stock ratio can be achieved not only310
when the two species are similar, but also when they differ such that an attractive attribute311
is compensated by a less attractive one.312
Conversely, when the species differ in multiple ways that work in the same direction,313
we observe a ‘reinforcing effect’. This corresponds to the movement perpendicularly to314
the contour lines in Figure 6. In this case, even relatively small differences in the species-315
specific parameters may lead to large differences in the final stock ratio.316
5 Discussion317
We have addressed two questions that are pertinent to any effort control system: whether318
species that are originally balanced (i.e., similar in stock size) can be maintained at a rel-319
atively balanced level as a result of profit-oriented fishing, and secondly, whether profit-320
oriented fishing could conserve species that are at low levels, such that relative stock levels321
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Figure 6: Parameter interactions under the even initial stock scenario for ratio of catchabilities (q̃) versus
difference in the stock elasticity of (a) harvest (schooling, b) and (b) ratio of prices (p). Colour gradient




2 ). High stock differences are found when the effects of two factors
are reinforcing each other. Similar stock levels appear around the mid-range area shown in white.Price is
constant (ω = [0,0]); other parameters as detailed in Table 1.
would be more balanced after the fishing season—a necessary, but not sufficient, condition322
for a sustainable use of an ecosystem. We have addressed these questions using a generic323
two-species dynamic bio-economic model, assuming fishers that are omniscient and profit-324
maximizing. Our main finding is that effort regulation is prone to exaggerating the stock325
abundance differences, particularly when the fishers are effective in selectively catching the326
more profitable species. Generally speaking, it is hard to achieve balanced relative stock327
levels. However, effort regulation may achieve its biological conservation goal under two328
general conditions:329
1. The species are sufficiently similar with respect to the key factors that determine the330
profitability of their harvest.331
2. When the key parameters counteract each other such that the resulting overall prof-332
itability is similar.333
Concerning the latter case, a low catchability can be compensated by a higher price, and334
vice versa. On the contrary, if the key parameters reinforce each other, instead of counter-335
acting, effort regulation can lead to increased differences in the relative stock levels, e.g.336
18
fishers keep harvesting the less abundant species. The degree to which one stock gets de-337
pleted depends on the fleet’s capacity to deplete the stock (the total allowable effort Q and338
catchability q̃) as well as on the degree to which high local density is maintained when339
stock is being depleted (stock elasticity of harvest b).340
Empirical studies have established that fishers’ behavioural choices can, to a large part,341
be understood based on their expectations on profits. Much of the evidence comes from342
studies on location choice (e.g., Eales and Wilen, 1986; Gillis et al., 1993; Andersen et al.,343
2010). Our model predicts that in the beginning of a fishing season, profit-maximizing344
fishers often target only a single stock. As that stock is fished down, its profitability declines345
and eventually equals that of the other stock. At this point, fishers would be expected to346
split their effort targeting both stocks. This kind of dynamic has been reported from the347
Turks and Caicos Islands, where the artisanal fishermen diversified their effort allocation348
after density of the initially favoured, more valuable target had sufficiently declined; price349
difference between the two targets was constant and did not influence targeting (Béné and350
Tewfik, 2001).351
Because profitability reflects a range of biological and economic parameters, target352
switches can occur in response to various factors, singly or together. For example, in353
demersal fisheries of Northeast Atlantic, changes in catchability caused by technological354
change are an important factor explaining long-term changes in target species (Marchal355
et al., 2006). In a mixed coastal trawl fishery in Taiwan, the fishers responded to day-to-356
day price fluctuations by increasing catches of species with positive price signals (Liu et al.,357
2018). The failure of the Faroese fisheries to switch away from catching depleted species358
was likely caused by price compensation (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007). Studies of small-scale359
fishermen have shown simultaneous influences of seasonal fluctuations in catchability and360
changes in price that lead to target switching (Salas et al., 2004; Naranjo-Madrigal and361
Bystrom, 2019).362
Our results show that differences in stock elasticity of harvest (b), reflecting a stock’s363
spacing behaviour and the fishers’ ability to find the fish, can be as important as differences364
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in the parameters traditionally emphasized when estimating revenues, namely catchability365
and price (Fig. 4 and 5). While it is commonly acknowledged that the relationship be-366
tween fish abundance and catch may not be linear, theoretical analyses typically assume367
that stock elasticity of harvest is unit-elastic (b = 1) or perfectly inelastic (b = 0; see Stein-368
shamn, 2011; Liu and Heino, 2013). Differences in b imply that the relative profitability369
of two species might switch ranks even when they both see similar proportional reduction370
in abundance. We are not, however, aware of any examples where changing in targeting371
can be explained by differences in b. While empirical analyses will implicitly account for372
this effect, it is probably difficult to detect in practice. Nevertheless, our results show that373
effort regulation is likely to fail when a mixed fishery is composed of a schooling and a374
non-schooling species.375
Separability, or the ability of fishers to target and catch a species separately from oth-376
ers, has a multifaceted role in effort regulation of mixed fisheries. The fishers’ ability to377
target the more abundant species lies at the core of the idea that effort regulation can protect378
species that are at low abundance. Our results show that separability is indeed necessary379
for fishery to be able to selectively harvest the more abundant species (Fig. 5a). How-380
ever, strong separability also increases the risk of seriously depleting one of the species381
(Figs. 4a and 5a), which can happen when one species has much higher price, catchability,382
and/or schooling tendency than the other. When separability is poor, such extreme out-383
comes are mostly avoided, but poor separability also prevents fishers from fishing down384
the more abundant species (Fig. 5a). The effect of separability is approximately linear,385
such that studies assuming perfect separability (Katsukawa and Matsuda, 2003; Bischi386
et al., 2013a,b) and complete lack of separability (Tromeur and Doyen, 2018) capture the387
extremes—realistic situations likely lie somewhere in between.388
It is worth noting that effort regulation incentivizes fishers to improve separability only389
when it helps them to increase the total value of their catches; there is no disincentive390
per se for catching non-target species. This is in stark contrast to catch quota regulation391
where lack of separability may prevent fisheries from fully utilizing quotas of some species392
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(e.g., Kuriyama et al., 2016; Mortensen et al., 2018), hence incentivizing investments to393
technology that improves separability. In any case, the degree to which fishers can adapt394
their catch profiles is a core question for mixed-fisheries management (Hoff et al., 2010).395
Our model includes only two species, while most fisheries are considerably more di-396
verse. Our analysis indicates that profit-oriented exploitation can help to maintain a bal-397
ance between two exploited species, but also that this requires a fortuitous balance between398
a number of biological and economic parameters. It is worth emphasizing that the higher399
is the number of exploitable species in a system, the more likely is that at least one of them400
does not meet this fortuitous balance. Therefore, challenges in using effort to regulation to401
manage mixed fisheries will increase with increasing species diversity.402
In our analysis, we have solely focused on stock dynamics during a single fishing sea-403
son. Dynamics between fishing seasons could either exacerbate or alleviate the differences404
in stock levels, depending on the processes related to biomass gain and loss (i.e., gain from405
recruitment of new individuals and body growth of existing individuals, and loss through406
mortality) that are stock-specific. Because of density-dependent effects, we can offer some407
general insights. If a stock is below the stock level that corresponds to maximum biomass408
production—and maximum sustainable yield (MSY)—then its biomass production will409
usually increase with increasing stock size. This implies that the relatively more depleted410
stock will also, on average, have lower biomass production, exacerbating the already ex-411
isting difference in the stock levels. On the other hand, if two stocks are larger than their412
respective MSY levels, then the larger stock will see less growth, and the difference in the413
stock levels is expected to decline. This suggests that effort regulation is more likely to414
afford a degree of protection to less abundant stocks when most stocks are at healthy levels415
(near MSY or higher), but that trusting effort regulation to conserve already depleted stocks416
will be particularly pernicious.417
Based on our numerical results and the arguments presented above, we suggest that ef-418
fort regulation is most likely to succeed when (1) the fishery is catching only a few species,419
(2) these species are biologically similar and have similar market niches (such that the420
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parameters determining revenues are similar), and (3) the species are at ‘healthy’ abun-421
dance levels. The first two conditions are probably most likely to be fulfilled in cold-water422
ecosystems where species diversity is low and taxonomically closely related species such423
as gadids dominate catches. Conversely, effort regulation is likely to fail to protect at least424
some species in species-rich temperate and tropical ecosystems—even more so when the425
fisheries already are overexploited, such as in the Mediterranean Sea, where effort reg-426
ulation is a part of the management toolbox and the overall status of fisheries resources427
remains poor (FAO, 2018). However, the fact that the effort control system for the Faroese428
demersal fisheries came close to fulfilling the first two desiderata and yet failed suggests429
that effort control lacks robustness even under relatively favourable conditions.430
The fragility of effort regulation is further increased if markets are paying a price pre-431
mium for rare species, as is the case for, e.g., Pacific bluefin tuna in Japan (Tokunaga,432
2017). This effect could be countered by consumer awareness campaigns, which have been433
successful in the past in promoting more sustainable fishing practices (Jacquet et al., 2010).434
Effort regulation is sometimes advocated as the solution to problems in managing mixed435
fisheries that is simpler, more flexible, and easier to implement than species-specific TAC436
regulation (Pope, 2002; European Commission, 2012). While some of these advantages are437
undeniable, our results warn against placing too much confidence on the ability of effort438
regulation to provide automatic protection for species that are depleted. Protection is only439
expected to occur when the targeted species initially offer similar profitability. This re-440
quires a fortuitous balance between a range of biological and economic parameters, which441
can be easily broken by exogenous or endogenous changes in prices. In this regards, sup-442
plementary regulations such as area management and gear restriction are needed, and a443
combination of TAC and TAE is sometimes more favourable (Squires et al., 2017).444
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Appendix: Derivation of the optimal harvest rules576
We rely on the Lagrangian conditions to characterize the optimal harvest rules. The scope577
of analysis in this section is limited to the case where the Baranov catch equation (also578
known as Beverton–Holt model) applies (i.e., b = 1 in Eq. 5) and when the price is exoge-579
nous.580
















= 0 and λ (∑
i
ei−n) = 0 (6b)















Note that Ai 1+τ2 +A−i
1−τ
2 − c in Eq. 6a can be interpreted as marginal profit of effort582
(MPE). Analysis of Kuhn-Tucker conditions reveals a general optimal harvest rule (τ 6= 0):583
• If e1 = 0 and e2 > 0, then ∂ L̄∂e1 < 0 and
∂ L̄
∂e2
= 0, such that MPE1 <MPE2.584
• If e1 > 0 and e2 = 0, then ∂ L̄∂e2 < 0 and
∂ L̄
∂e1
= 0, such that MPE1 >MPE2.585
• If e1 > 0 and e2 > 0, then ∂ L̄∂e1 =
∂ L̄
∂e2
= 0, such that MPE1 =MPE2.586
The above rule states that fishermen will target the species that gives the higher MPE, or587
both species will be targeted if their MPEs are same. If λ > 0, the value of additional boat588
is positive and the fleet capacity constraint becomes binding; i.e., ei + e−i = n.589
The optimal rule for τ = 0, a special case, is slightly different from the above general590




= 0 can be satisfied, hence ei > 0, i = 1,2. Any effort591
allocation satisfying the fleet capacity constraint will be optimal, because every unit of592
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effort is equally divided between two species. We consider τ = 0 as a trivial case, hence593
the subsequent discussion will focus on the cases when τ > 0.594
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